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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Petitioner, in this Petition for Rehearing, contends that the
court granted the Utah State Tax Commission a greater amount of
discretion

than

legislature.

was

intended

by

the

Supreme

Court

or

the

The standard of review in this matter should be a

"correction of error" standard rather than the standard used by the
court which upholds the decision of the tax commission unless it is
"unreasonable or arbitrary".
Petitioner also claims that the distinction made by the State
Tax Commission as to the differences between a real property
transaction and a personal property transaction does not fit even
the standard of reasonableness.
1

Petitioner believes the Utah

Supreme Court has set forth the type of analysis that must be used
in such cases; and that neither the Utah State Tax Commission nor
this Court has used that standard.
Assuming, but not admitting, that the Court was correct
concerning the two points raised above, Petitioner contends that
the Court has ordered the wrong transaction taxed. The transaction
to be taxed should involve the sale by the contractor-dealer to the
ultimate consumer; and this Petitioner should not be liable for any
payment or collection of sales taxes.
POINT I
IN ITS RULING ON THE STANDARD OF REVIEW, THIS COURT HAS
GRANTED THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION GREATER DISCRETION
THAN INTENDED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AND THE
LEGISLATURE.
The Court, in its opinion in this matter, first stated that
this Court would review agency decisions interpreting statutory law
by a "correction of error standard" unless the legislature has
expressly or impliedly granted the agency discretion to interpret
and administer the statute at issue.

The Court then found the

implied grant of discretion, and changed the standard of review to
one that defers to the Tax Commission, unless that decision by the
Tax Commission is "unreasonable or arbitrary".

In doing so, the

court referred to the case of BJ-Titan Services v. State Tax
Commission, 842 P.2d 822 (Utah, 1992), where the Utah Supreme Court
found "some discretion in determining whether a certain transaction
2
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I he

court stated there:
Whether the subject matter of a sales transaction is
deemed real property or tangible personal property will
depend on the facts of each case. The weighing of *:he
various relevant factors leading to the ultimate decision
by the Commission as to whether a taxpayer is a real
property contractor or not is a ruling that is based part
on law and part on fact
In ruling on such issues, the
Commission must necessarily exercise a degree of
discretion, and we accordingly defer to the Commission's
determination. We will not upset its ruling unless it is
unreasonable or arbitrary,. 8 39 P 2d at 3 07,
The important part of th:i s statement is the question of
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question in the minds of the Tax Commission; and it should have
been.

Whether the relevant factors were weighed and whether the

appropriate law was applied should be decided by a "correction of
error" standard as previously suggested by Petitioner. Only after
finding that the State Tax Commission went through the appropriate
procedure and considered the appropriate factors, must they be
granted the discretion referred to by the Utah Supreme Court.
There is no question in anyone's mind that Valgardson Housing
Systems makes modular buildings which become part of the real
estate as soon as they are attached.

There is also no question

that Petitioner is a licensed general contractor in the state of
Utah.

Those items have been proved, have been stipulated to, and

are not in controversy. The fact that those items were ignored by
the Utah State Tax Coinmission in its decision is a legal error that
should be corrected by this Court.
POINT II
THE DISTINCTION MADE BY THE STATE TAX COMMISSION BETWEEN
A TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY TRANSACTION AND THAT
INVOLVING AN IMPROVEMENT TO REAL ESTATE IS NEITHER
CORRECT NOR REASONABLE.
In Point III of its Reply Brief, Petitioner cited the case of
Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. Sterling Custom Homes Corp.. 283
NW.2d 573 (Wis. 1979).
present one.

That case was almost identical to the

The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the modular
4

construction company was a contractor, was involved in real estate
construction activities, and was entitled to have its activities
taxed as improvements to real property.

The decision by the

Wisconsin Supreme Court goes to the very heart of the matter at
issue here. Because the Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the same
contentions made by the Utah State Tax Commission and refuted them
in their entirety, Petitioner asks this Court to review that
decision once more.

At the risk of being redundant, Petitioner

therefore sets forth once again the reasoning of that court.
In a well-reasoned opinion, the Court stated:
In reaching our conclusion that Sterling Homes was a
contractor and a consumer of the goods, we look to the
general scope of its activities in its home-construction
enterprise. 283 N.W.2d at 574.
The facts of the Wisconsin case were almost identical to the
present facts:
When the foundation was completed and the builder was
ready to erect the house, the taxpayer loaded the
components in the sequence that conformed to the order
that the components would be used at the job site. The
components were delivered to the job site by the tax
payer's trucks and drivers. At the job site, the larger
components were unloaded by crane. The crane operators
were hired by the builder, but were usually selected by
one of the taxpayers salesmen. . . . Although the
drivers7 only defined on-site responsibility was to keep
a report with respect to the erection, they often helped
or supervised, because they were very familiar with the
process. 283 N.W.2d at 574-5.
The court went on to say:
The taxability

of the transaction
5

transferring the

components to the builder is dependent on whether
Sterling Homes was engaged in "real property construction
activities." If Sterling Homes was engaged in such an
activity, than it is a contractor or a subcontractor and
is a consumer of the tangible personal property used in
real property construction activities and the sales tax
applies to transfers to Sterling Homes and not by it.
The facts demonstrate that, in all respects but one, the
taxpayer was engaged in real property construction
activities. The lone exception is that Sterling Homes
conducted its construction activities at a factory,
rather than at the building site. The taxpayer used the
materials it purchased for only a single purpose — to
construct custom-designed homes to be assembled at
predetermined locations on foundations which were
specifically designed for the prefabricated components.
The components thus assembled were consumed by the very
process of fabrication, for which they would be useless
in their fabricated form except for the very building for
which designed.
The distinction between on-site and off-site construction
of the components is not a criterion upon which the
legislature has hinged the question of taxability.
Rather, taxability is to be determined by whether or not
the taxpayer is engaged in 'real property construction
activities.' The record leaves no doubt that Sterling
Homes was so engaged. 283 N.W.2d at 575.
It is Petitioner's contention that the Utah Supreme Court has
adopted the basic reasoning of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the
Chicago Bridge case, referred to in Point I.

In that case, the

Utah Supreme Court set forth the kind of analysis to be used to
determine questions such as the present one.

The Supreme Court

stated:
In effect, a real property contractor is treated as a
consumer for sales tax purposes.
The reason for this rule is that materials which are
6
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The pumps were removable without harm to the structures
on which they were placed; (2) they were manufactured
with the idea that they could be used at different
locations; (3) the parties contemplated that the pumps
would be removed for repairs or replacement; (4) the
primary purpose of the sales agreements was the sale and
purchase
of
the
pumps
assembled
according
to
specifications and the installation of the pumps was
merely incidental to that purpose; (5) the installation
was for the convenience of the purchaser because of the
great weight of the pumps; and (6) the sales agreements
did not indicate that the pumps were intended to be
treated as real property upon installation. 839 P.2d at
307.
The Supreme Court, in the Chicago Bridge case, found that
Petitioner was a real property contractor, even when the materials
were not installed in the state of Utah. In doing so, it relied on
the fact that the tanks manufactured by Chicago Bridge, and which
were installed by agents of Chicago Bridge in another state were
"not readily removable" and they were not intended to be removed.
839 P.2d at 307.
The theory of taxing real property contractors was laid out in
the BJ-Titan Services case where the court stated that contractors:
. . . purchased the materials not to resell them in their
original form, but for the purpose of changing their
nature from personal to real property. For this reason,
the exemption for ingredients or component parts of
tangible personal property does not apply to contractors.
842 P.2d at 827.
Clearly Petitioner herein is engaged in changing the nature
from personal to real property.

When the home is put on a crane

and removed from the truck, that conversion process is almost
8
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decision by the Utah State Tax Commission could onJ y be upheld if

Utah Supreme Court and stll 1 rejected Petitioner # s arguments.

The

fact that they have not been willi nq to do so makes their decision
unreasonable, per se

GIVEN THE COURT'S RULING ON OTHER MATTERS, THE COURT'S
FINDING THAT IT IS PETITIONER'S RESPONSIBILITY TO COLLECT
AND PAY THE SALES TAX IS IN ERROR.
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however, in determining that Petitioner thus becomes a "retailer"
for any purpose whatsoever.

The parties have stipulated that a

special rule exists in the case of contractors. That special rule
allows the real property contractor to purchase building materials
in a tax exempt transaction, and then to determine and pay the tax
only upon the sale of that home to the ultimate buyer.
special rule is set out in the additional

stipulated

That
facts

submitted with Petitioner's original brief, and also submitted
herewith.

Assuming (but not admitting) that the court is correct

that Valgardson Housing Systems is merely selling building supplies
to a contractor (the dealer) then the court is taxing the wrong
transaction. The purchase of building supplies is tax exempt, and
it is up to the dealer to determine and pay the tax.
CONCLUSION
Petitioners petition for a rehearing should be granted, the
Court should re-examine the legal issues as set forth above, and
the original decision herein should be vacated.
CERTIFICATION
Counsel for Petitioner hereby certifies, pursuant to Rule 35
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Petition for
Rehearing is made in good faith, and is not made for the purposes
of delay.

Petitioner has previously paid all disputed taxes, and

no collection action is pending.
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DATED this

day of

__. 1993,
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS
/

^&sfil.

W. Andrew McCullough
Attorney for Petitioner
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of fA{^^cA^J

1993,

I did mail two true and correct copies of the above and foregoing
Reply Brief, postage prepaid to Clark Snelson, Attorney for
Respondent, 36 South State Street, 11th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111,
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W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH (2170)
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Attorneys for Petitioner
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Telephone: (801) 224-2119
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

9

STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo

10
11

ADDITIONAL STIPULATED
FACTS

VALGARDSON HOUSING SYSTEMS,

12
Petitioner,

13
Appeal No. 91-1323

vs.

14
15
16

AUDITING DIVISION OF THE UTAH
STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent.
oooOooo

17
18

COME NOW the parties to the above-entitled action and, in

19

addition to the Stipulated Facts previously entered herein, agree

20

and stipulate to the following facts:

21

1.

Petitioner purchases building materials in a tax exempt

22

transaction.

23

2.

Petitioner pays sales tax on the sales of his homes,

24

based

25

including cash, credit, installment and conditional sales made

26

during that period.

27

of the home, and including transportation costs

28

Stipulted Facts Nos. 23, 24 and 25).

killough, Jones,
& Ivins
) South Slate St
Suite 10

on total sales made during the period

of each return,

Sales tax is paid on 50% of the purchase price
(see previous

OOOnnmn

1
2
3
4
DATED t h i s

5

J±itd a y

of

MLf-

., 1992

MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS
6
7
W. Andrew McCuliough
Attorney for Petitioner

8
9
10

DATED t h i s

R. day

of

flka^

1992,

11
12

*-."\

J/U£

ClarK^L. Snelson
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent

13
14
n±sc\vhstax.asf

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
McCuliough, Jorws,
& Ivins
930 South State St
Suite 10

00000011

